6.0 Economic Participation

It makes sense to consider economic structures and issues when discussing governance and participation in governance. A casual look at the mainstream media reveals a great deal of government energy and activity to do with the economy. In addition, business interests spend a lot of resources and energy learning about, analysing, and making changes to what governments do.

The federal and provincial governments retain most powers on intervening directly in the economy. On the local tier, the nature of this economic and political relationship is less clear. Nonetheless, local economic conditions and structures are important contexts that shape municipal political participation as we shall see from the following.

6.1 Local Economy

"The Hamilton-Wentworth area has a diverse employment base. The city of Hamilton has a reputation as a centre of manufacturing, particularly the steel industry... As well, the surrounding area still has a significant agricultural sector" (O'Brien, 1999: 15). The new city of Hamilton is home to 1,060 farm businesses. 78% of the land area of Hamilton is zoned rural agricultural. Hamilton is Ontario's leading producer of cabbage and other kohl crops (broccoli, Brussels sprouts), for example.

Hamilton's economy is dominated by industrial manufacturing, the city's largest industry grouping. Although the single largest employer in the area is the Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation, the Stelco and Dofasco steel mills hold second and third position, respectively. Hamilton Harbour is by far the top port for inbound cargo in the Great Lakes, receiving 12 million tonnes of cargo each year (the next highest is Detroit with 4 million tonnes).

In the 2001 census, the sector employing the single greatest proportion of people in Hamilton was manufacturing and construction industries, at 26.2%, followed by health and education, at 18.3%. Both of these are above the provincial figures of 22.0% and 15.1%, respectively. Conversely, a smaller proportion of workers in Hamilton, versus workers in Ontario, can be found working in agriculture and resource based industries

(2.0% versus 3.2%), finance and real estate (5.6% versus 6.7%), business services (15.5% versus 19.1%), and other services (16.3% versus 18.1%). The median income in Hamilton in 2001 was $22,927, slightly less than the $24,816 provincial median. The proportion of people who received government transfer income was higher in Hamilton (12.1%) than in Ontario as a whole (9.8%).

The United Steelworkers of America have a long history at Stelco, although Dofasco has not unionised. Freeman (1982) shows that, although the steelworkers union is active as an organisation, there are low levels of participation in the union. He comments:

> In the broad political system the existence of the vote and the rights of limited participation by citizens give the population the illusion that they hold political power and that the system is responsive to them. In the meantime economic and political elites continue to rule much as they have always done. A similar pattern exists at Stelco. Because there is a political system in the local that actively represents the workers, there is the illusion that the union has real political power that fundamentally challenges the company. Meanwhile management continue to control their plant with little real check on their ability to operate (Freeman, 1982: 240).

A 1978 report noted that according to 1971 census data, there was a relatively low participation rate of women in the Hamilton-Wentworth labour force compared to the whole of Ontario (41.3% and 44.3% respectively), although the rate for men was almost identical (80.4% and 80.3%). "The most likely explanation for this difference is a lack of opportunity for women to find employment, which discourages them from joining the labour force. Hamilton's specialisation in heavy manufacturing means that there is a relatively low demand for female labour" (Stewart, 1978: 28).

It was not until 1980 that the first group of women, with the exception of those recruited for the war effort, were hired to work in a blue-collar job at Stelco (Finlayson, 1999: 214). A 1985 report from the Social Planning and Research Council of Hamilton and District concluded that, compared with women in Ontario and in Canada, Hamilton-Wentworth had the highest percentage of women with less than grade nine education, the lowest percentage of women graduating from secondary school, and the lowest percentage of women to attend university. Although some racial minority women were recruited as teachers from the West Indies, another group of women came to Hamilton-Wentworth from the same source area through a program for domestic workers.

In 2001 census data, labour force participation by both men and women lagged slightly below the provincial average. In Hamilton, 57.7% of women participated in the labour force, compared to 61.5% in Ontario. For men, these numbers were 70.0% and 73.4%, respectively.

In Hamilton-Wentworth, the "unemployment rate in April 1998 was 5.6% which is below the national average. In sum, the area has a diverse economy with reasonably stable employment levels" (O'Brien, 1999: 15). Over the past twenty-five years, "growth in the City of Hamilton has been rather flat which is characteristic of most central core cities. The Region has experienced somewhat greater growth although the percentage increase in population in the Region over the twenty-five year period (1971-1996) has

been 14.2% which is exactly half the provincial increase of 28.4%" (O'Brien, 1999: 14). "The main growth has occurred in Ancaster, Flamborough, and Stoney Creek" (*ibid*: 15).

A local study of labour force issues co-sponsored by the municipal and federal governments, and the Hamilton-Wentworth Training Board, emphasised the need to attract skilled immigrants to the future of the Hamilton economy. Data from the 2001 census confirm that the workforce in Canada is aging and faces a skills crisis in coming years. Domestic population growth is minimal and, in fact, "immigration totally dominated Hamilton's population growth over the 1990's" (*HR Matters*, 2002: 14). Immigration currently accounts for 85% of Hamilton's total population growth, and that could reach 100% in the coming decades (*ibid*: 16). Research in other parts of the country has recognised that the great economic benefits that come from immigration can only be fully realised with proactive government efforts to facilitate labour market integration (*Enhancing Opportunity*, 1997: v).

"Considering the breadth of emerging worker shortages, labour markets are about to become much more competitive. It is the competition that presents Hamilton with its biggest human resources challenges." One of those challenges is "how to attract more and better-educated immigrants to the community" (*ibid*: 20.) It recommends that the city "[l]aunch a campaign to attract more immigrants to Hamilton, especially those with a more advantageous labour profile" and "[s]trengthen Hamilton's immigration resettlement capacity, including language training and cultural orientation" (*ibid*: 22).

In the mid-1970s, coinciding with the introduction of regional government, Hamilton began experiencing economic decline.

"Regionalization brought with it a startling increase in costs which was unexpected because of the prevailing assumption that bigness meant greater efficiency and hence savings in administrative costs" (Dear, Drake, Reeds, 1987: 165). In the years immediately after regionalisation, cost continued to be a big issue. In the 1977 provincial election, Hamilton-area Liberals "decided to make regional government the issue of the Liberal party – and it became the foremost issue in the minds of the public in southern Ontario" (Channan, 1980: 44). "Of course we knew the regional government had caused chaos and drained the taxpayers' pockets" (*ibid*: 39).

Various authors, writing in the context of the regionalisation of Hamilton-Wentworth, have linked governance issues to issues of overall population growth and economic development (Dear, Drake, Reeds, 1987; Weaver, 1995; Fenn, 1998; O'Brien, 1999). However, it is unclear whether this relationship is causal or just coincidental, since many other older, industrial cities across North America experienced similar phenomena over that timeframe (e.g. Lynd, 1997: 159-188), which may indicate an important role for larger economic factors, and a smaller one for the specifics of local governance.

Changes in the steel industry were especially important: "After the mid-1970s, the deindustrialisation of Hamilton, the contraction of the steel industry, and a sequence of recessions have created pessimism, misery and despair" (Weaver, 1995: 8). This had serious impacts, and "[d]uring the 1970s Hamilton's population grew at only two-thirds of the Ontario rate and at half the Canadian rate. Even more striking, its labour force grew

at less than half the provincial rate. Between May 1981 and January 1983, Hamilton lost a quarter of its manufacturing jobs" (Dear, Drake, Reeds, 1987: 238).

As well, none of the authors writing about Hamilton's population growth and economic development over this period has noted that the post-1974 timeframe also coincides with a dramatic increase in racial diversity in the region. Certainly, election campaigns have ignored issues of race or racism as they affect these issues. It could be argued that, by focusing narrowly on business or economic development, without taking into account the differential impacts of decisions on different parts of the population exacerbates the problem of low community participation. As described below, poverty (i.e. lack of access to the benefits of economic growth) is much more prevalent in racial minority communities in the city.

Another consequence of overall economic difficulty in the area is a relative reduction in the ability of municipal governments to raise money to spend on social programs. Access and equity programs are often seen, particularly in the current political climate of budgetary austerity, as peripheral to the work of municipalities. Despite this danger to serious anti-racism community development, the City of Hamilton has, in partnership with the Working Group on Racial Equity, in these times produced some infrastructural changes whose long-term impacts, of course, remain to be seen (see Action section for details).

Decisions related to zoning and property development are an important part of the overall spectrum of municipal responsibilities. While Hamilton has been recognised by the UN as a model community for sustainable development and is the only Canadian community selected to implement the UN's Local Agenda 21 Model Community Program (Kendrick and Moore, 1995), the city's image continues to be less than green. Within the city, local environmental problems continue to be hot issues, and many of these conflicts relate to the development and/or use of property.

Although the suburbs and the Hamilton-Wentworth region/new city of Hamilton continued to grow, the population within the boundaries of the city of Hamilton peaked in the mid-1970s. Since the 1970s, the region has been characterised by the development of suburban shopping malls and housing subdivisions and the continuing decline of downtown Hamilton.

> People, corporations and local governments have been forced to react to the slow economic growth of Hamilton during the 1970s and to its decline during the 1980s. Essentially, within Hamilton this reaction has taken the form of a strong pro-development coalition of business and local government. This coalition has promoted infrastructural investments by the local governments that have the ostensible aim of attracting business investment to the city. In the short term, however, the beneficiaries may be the promoters (Dear, Drake, Reeds, 1987: 241).

Business issues have dominated the regional agenda. A proposal hotly debated for almost forty years is the Red Hill Creek Expressway. Fitzpatrick (1993) concludes that the decision-making on the Red Hill issue appeared elite-dominated. Those with business interests wish to see the road built, while others questioned the economic benefits projected from the expressway construction, and/or have environmental

concerns about protecting green space in the valley, as well as air quality and water quality in the region (Peace, 1998: 240-241).

"'Ironically,' writes O'Brien (1975: 83-83), `it is the apolitical orientation of community development which is so instrumental in promoting rancorous conflicts' since it is an orientation that ignores the 'possibility of creating organizational structures and strategies which might institutionalize the conflict'" (Breton, 1991: 4).

Property development issues can also be important to racial minority communities. The conflict over the Sikh gurudwara in Dundas has already been mentioned. Siematycki notes that "in Toronto as in other immigrant cities of the world, land use conflicts have become particularly acute flashpoints of conflict for diverse immigrant and ethnoracial groups in global cities" (1998: 20). He notes "nine municipalities experienced conflict over the location of places of worship for minority religious communities, particularly mosques." This resonates with early Canadian history where land use and ownership conferred political rights that were often determined by race, if not religion.

6.2 The Economy, the Individual, and Participation

"There are indications that access to political office is limited by an increasingly severe socioeconomic bias. Holding public office today is largely a pursuit of the more affluent" (Bledsoe, 1993: 9).

Bledsoe makes the point that the low rates of pay for municipal politicians means that municipal politics is dominated by the middle-class, who are not motivated by financial reward so much as by a sense of civic duty. Since the cuts to school board trustees' salaries, it would appear that there is a reversion to the upper-middle-class involvement in the school system where only the people who are financially secure can afford to volunteer their time, though, as mentioned in the Political Participation section, this is less of an issue for city councillors. "`Civic duty', Prewitt explains, `tends to be little more than a middle class version of *noblesse oblige* and exaggerates the class bias in the selection of public officials" (*ibid*). Many of the *Unfurling The Flag* respondents were highly involved in community activities and had a highly developed sense of voluntarism, public service and civic duty.

As well, election campaigns require money, and socioeconomic status can have implications for campaign financing. Research done on campaign funding during the 1997 municipal electing in Hamilton found that nine of the 17 successful candidates for Hamilton city council spent at least some of their own money on the campaign – five of them spent more than $1000 of their own (Neigh, 2000a: 6). Being unable or unwilling to spend one's own money on campaigning gives a candidate less control over the donations they accept or reject. Those candidates who spent some of their own money averaged $715 apiece from development interests, or about 12% of their campaign budgets, while those who relied entirely on donations accepted an average of $4,600 from developers, or around half their campaign budget (Neigh, 2000a: 12).

In fact, of the money raised by candidates through donations of $100 or greater, which is the bulk of the money that was raised, at least 44% came from the development industry. When one considers donations just from companies and unions, the

development sector accounted for 58% of donations. Because of difficulties in identifying some companies which donated, these are probably underestimates. At least seven of the top ten donors in terms of total dollars given were connected to property development or management (Neigh, 2000b: 6).

Moran (1986) describes three sources of fundraising: individual donations, business donations, and fundraising events. *Unfurling The Flag* respondents in this study cited fundraising as an important barrier that their campaign spending. No respondents mentioned soliciting donations from companies, developers, or unions and, in fact, none of the respondents was able to find effective strategies to increase fundraising revenues. Kushner et al. found in a study of Ontario municipal election campaigns published in the mid-1990s (1997) that candidates spent, on average, $6,658 on their bids for office. Incumbents spent an average of $10,733, and non-incumbents spent an average of $5,181. Winners spent on average $10,974, losers averaged $4,696. None of the respondents in *Unfurling The Flag* spent the maximum allowed under election legislation, and the average spending was only $3,371. Most had to contribute substantial funds to their own campaigns. Fundraising was also identified as a major barrier at the planning session and the community roundtable.

Financial barriers to electoral participation are likely to have an even greater impact in 2003. In the elections in 1994, 1997, and 2000 the expenditure limits were a base amount of $5,500 for candidates for mayor and $3,500 for candidates for council, plus fifty cents per eligible elector in the jurisdiction in which each candidate was running (*Candidate's Guide*, 1997: 21; *Candidate's Guide*, 2000: 22). Thus the spending limits increased over those years only as a result of population growth. In 2003, the base amounts have been increased to $7,500 and $5,000 for mayoralty and council candidates, respectively, and the per capita amounts to seventy cents per elector (*Candidate's Guide*, 2003: 23). As well, the nomination fee for mayoralty candidates has increased from $100 to $200, though the fee for council candidates is still $100 (*Candidate's Handbook*, 1997: 3; *Candidate's Guide*, 2003: 2).

One barrier that functions in raising money for municipal campaigns in Hamilton that is absent from provincial and federal efforts is that the latter are tax deductible whereas the former are not. Jessica M. Brennan wrote about the possible impacts of restructuring on marginalised groups without the accompanying legal changes:

> I suggest that laws be revised to make it easier for those with modest incomes to raise money (e.g. through tax credits) to increase their fundraising ability. Unless that occurs democracy will be restricted to those who can afford it or who already have a high profile. This probably eliminates youths, women, and people of colour from putting forward their voices as representatives" (*Public Submissions*, #203: 3)

National data, and data from Toronto, confirm the racialisation of poverty in Canada. Racial minority women are more likely to be in the labour force than white women, but make, on average, $3000 per year less. They experience higher unemployment (15% in 1996) than white women (9%), white men (9.9%), or racial minority men (13%) (Canada, 2000). Using national 1996 census numbers, racial minorities were shown to have, on average, a higher level of education than the population as a whole, but also higher unemployment rates and lower levels of income (Kunz, Milan, and Schetagne, 2000).

Labour force data from Statistics Canada in 1998 showed a 24% gap in before-tax income and a 20% gap in after tax income between racial minority and white Canadians, up slightly from 1996 (Galabuzi, 2001). A number of these studies have controlled extensively for other factors, such as length of time in the country, education, age, and so on, and have concluded that systemic racism is a major contributing factor in these differences. Data from the last census on this issue have yet to appear.

> Racially visible groups earn less than other men and women. 28% of racially visible women were low-income earners, compared with 20% of all women. The average annual income for a racially visible woman in Canada was $13,800, $1,800 less than the average for all women ($15,600) and almost $9,000 less than that of racially visible men ($22,600), with a higher rate of family and child poverty (Kunz et al., 2000). The average income of racially visible men was $22,608, $6,769 less than the figure for other men ($29,377). The earnings of immigrant women of non-European origin were 90% of the earnings of immigrant women of European origin (Saidullah, 2001: section 4).

> The elimination of specific job sectors through policies such as free trade, the exploitation of volunteers, the cuts to employment benefits and the threats to job security create an anxious environment for already disadvantaged communities trying to gain a foothold in Canadian society. What is worrying is that conditions do not improve for some racially visible groups the longer they remain in Canada. For example, racially visible persons born in Canada still earn almost 30% less than other native-born Canadians (*ibid*).

Saidullah (2001: section 4) notes that "more racially visible persons live in poverty (35.6%) than the general population (17%), although they are more highly educated than the Canadian-born population." Research done in Toronto has shown that almost every poor grouping in Toronto was racially visible (Ornstein, 2000). In this study, over 50% of the families in many racial minority groups lived below the official low income cut-off (LICO) point. This rate is less than 10% for other white, European and British-origin groups. Afghans, Ethiopians, Ghanaians, and Somalis were the poorest with rates ranging from 52.2-70%. They tended to be trapped in low-wage jobs, despite the majority in these communities having a high school education. According to Ornstein, communities, such as Iranians, Sri Lankans, Tamils and Vietnamese, face joblessness, low-skill jobs, low education and high school drop-out rates. Approximately 50% of Aboriginal, Central American, Jamaican, people of multiple South Asian heritage and West Indian communities lived in poverty (2000). In addition, it is estimated that around 200,000 undocumented and stateless persons live in fear in this country. Because of their undocumented status, these individuals and families face great challenges in gaining access to formal education, healthcare, jobs and benefits (Saidullah 2001: section 4). Muslim Canadians, who are overwhelmingly racial minorities, tend to have higher significantly higher unemployment rates than Christian or Jewish Canadians (Hamdani, 1989: 2).

Racial minority workers accounted for approximately 12% of Canada's labour force in 1996, an increase from 5.9% in 1986. Aboriginal people made up approximately 3%. This is increasing at around twice the Canadian average due to a high birthrate. Laws and regulations imposed by the Canadian state have devastated traditional livelihoods among Aboriginal people, including fishing and gaming (*ibid*).

Though they have educational qualifications above the Canadian average, racial minorities are less likely to land the best jobs. Many work in machining, management, scientific, and service-sector jobs (de Silva, 1997). Racial minority university graduates aged 25-44 faced barriers in holding professional or managerial jobs, while white Canadians were over represented in this sector. Many racial minorities are concentrated in manual labour, service, and clerical jobs, which tend to be lower paying. Their lowest concentrations are in teaching, health, and transportation. Racial minorities tended to be better represented in scientific fields, but white Canadians had a higher rate of representation in senior management jobs (Kunz et al., 2000).

Racial minorities were 12% of Canada's population in 1996 but less than 3% of executives and only 5.9% of federal government employees, though the federal public service claims that representation of racial minorities will rise to 20% in the near future. Of those racial minorities employed by the federal government in 1994, 34% were in administration and foreign service, 28.1% in administrative support, 25% in scientific or professional jobs, 6.9% in technical work, 5.9% in operational work, and 1% were executives. In the federally regulated private sector, racial minorities made up 8.2% of the workforce (Saidullah 2001: section 4). A workforce survey of municipal staff is due to be conducted by the City of Hamilton, and it should provide much needed data. Earlier claims of the city having a representative workforce were derided by key community figures.

Recent immigrants, who are disproportionately racial minorities, do not fare as well economically as people who immigrated to Canada in earlier years, and a number of factors that used to give some newcomers a better chance to succeed economically no longer have that effect. According to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, there has been "a worsening situation on entry and over time for immigrants who arrived in the early 1990s, relative to those who arrived in the 1980s. The earnings premiums associated with age, education and knowledge of official languages have all but disappeared" (*Economic Outcomes of Recent Immigrants to Canada*, 1999: 9).

There is little local research on the socioeconomic characteristics of racial minorities in the City of Hamilton. A recent document briefly examining community trends related to poverty, released by the Social Planning and Research Council of Hamilton (SPRC), quotes 1996 census data showing that racial minorities in Hamilton had a poverty rate of 41%, versus 21.9% for the population as a whole. Using data from income-tax returns, the poverty rate as a whole was shown to have increased, with the number of low-income households in the city increasing by about one-fifth between 1996 and 2000 (Neigh, 2002: 3).

As tax returns contain very little in the way of demographic information, a simple relationship between racial identity and poverty could not be established from this data set. However, a less direct correlation was shown: for each forward sortation area (an arbitrary piece of geography in which the first three characters of the postal code are the same) the percentage of racial minorities according to the 1996 census was plotted against the percentage of residents living in poverty, according to 2000 tax return data. It found that there was a striking relationship between the proportion of racial minorities in a neighbourhood and the prevalence of poverty in that neighbourhood (Neigh, 2002: 5-7). Papillon explains this kind of trend in the context of Canadian cities in general:

> It seems evident that the concentration of certain people in poorer neighbourhoods is the result of broader structural factors such as lack of employment, systemic discrimination and lack of access to social services. As Graham and Peters (2002) note, it is not because Aboriginal people live in poor neighbourhoods that they are poor. One should not confuse the result and the cause. The same conclusion is equally valid for immigrants. It is not their concentration in certain neighbourhoods that creates poverty (2002: 14).

The SPRC document recommends that, in Hamilton, "an understanding of the ongoing disproportionate experience of poverty by women and racialized minority individuals of both genders must be integral to all current and future anti-poverty measures. Sexism and racism must be dealt with explicitly and pro-actively, both by fleshing out the scant body of local research on the role of these things in the experience of poverty, and by taking immediate action based on national research" (Neigh, 2002: 8). One of the candidates for mayor in 2000 was a long time, white anti-poverty activist.

Since racial minorities often experience barriers to employment, their progress in Canada tends to be limited. That again has an impact on name recognition, networking with power brokers, fundraising and other election necessaries. Racial minorities' claims to advancement in Canada are usually rejected by casting doubt on their qualifications, experiences, credentials and "fit." “They face racism and discrimination in the workplace and barriers to jobs, resources, services, supports or political power in Canada” (Saidullah, 2001: section 4).

> Racism and sexism are a feature of the Canadian workplace. 73% of all cases of race, ethnic and other forms of discrimination happen in the workplace, according to the Ontario Human Rights Commission. Compounded discrimination, for example, the genderized racism faced by racially visible women, is poorly understood or acted on. In addition, human rights commissions rarely have the teeth to enforce judgments and the awards are not large enough to act as deterrents (*ibid*).

For new Canadians who are racial minorities, racism can be compounded by various barriers specific to newcomers. Barriers to accessing employment-related services, the pressures of relocation, and refusal to recognise credentials and experience gained in other countries all play a role (*Unfulfilled Expectations, Missed Opportunities*, 1998: iii). Immigrants from "third world" countries are less likely to be working in the occupation of their choice than those from other countries – six months after arrival in Canada, 47% of "third world" immigrants were not in occupations of their choosing, versus only 37% of immigrants from other countries (Hamdani, 1989: 5).

A survey of 722 Chinese Canadians who were trained in other countries found that even though 80% had professional qualifications, only 31% had worked as professionals in Canada (Li Zong, 1999: 9). Nonrecognition or devaluation of foreign credentials was considered to be the single biggest factor contributing to inaccessibility of professional occupations or downward economic mobility by the individuals themselves (*ibid*: 10). A significant number of respondents also identified skin colour racism (42%), national or ethnic origin (37%), and speaking English as a second language (50%) as barriers to accessing the employment for which they are qualified (*ibid*: 12).

Persons who are rich or self-employed or employed part-time, students, or retired, have more time available for effective campaigning. Although, people who sell things (real estate, insurance, books) may not have the "prestige" of a professional, they get to meet a lot of people and have high name recognition. On the one hand, professional qualifications are seen as an advantage. At least three respondents in the *Unfurling The Flag* study referred to the power of being able to put "Dr." in front of your name.

One respondent recognised these advantages. That respondent had a professional background, was self-employed part-time, with a high-earning professional spouse. Freelance writing brought the respondent high name recognition, which resulted in electoral success. Another respondent who was successfully elected did not have the same advantageous socioeconomic status or professional or educational background. However, that respondent had a working spouse. Moreover, the second respondent chose to work with the underprivileged and felt that school board trustees were overpaid. Both respondents were female.

Lawyers are often seen as having a professional skills set well suited for politics, particularly for higher office. In Hamilton, there have been very few racial minority lawyers. However, every racial minority lawyer in Hamilton identified during the course of our study in 2000 had run for political office: Lincoln Alexander (successfully elected to federal Parliament), Krishan Channan (ran provincially in 1977), and Mark Coakley was nominated by the Green Party for the provincial by-election in 2000.

In her book on racism, Margaret Cannon mentioned a racial minority politician whose professional qualifications were questioned by a media campaign. Jag Bhaduria was a Toronto area MP who was "forced to resign from the Liberal Party caucus in January 1994 amid allegations that he lied about having a law degree" (1995: 224). She quotes a South Asian Canadian:

> First of all, Jag Bhaduria didn't do anything illegal or immoral. Claiming to have a degree when you've only studied the subject is wrong, and I'm not defending that, but he didn't say he was a doctor and then attempt brain surgery. He didn't injure anyone. He didn't open an office and start to practise law. There is such a thing in India as an intermediate stage when one is getting a professional degree, and at that stage the person is often allowed to work in a law office or whatever. So there is some background here for Mr. Bhaduria. Now, I can think of several reasons why Mr. Bhaduria would do this. First, he wanted to impress the people in his riding. He does have several quite legitimate degrees, so it seems, but many MPs are lawyers and he thought that mentioning his law studies would be of benefit to him. So he said that he had an intermediate degree. He didn't lie. He just didn't correct any misapprehension that might occur... I have to conclude... That Mr. Bhaduria's race is an issue. If he had been white, I don't think this degree would have been such an issue. But he is brown (Cannon, 1995: 224-227).

Several *Unfurling The Flag* study respondents suggested that a business or entrepreneurial orientation was much more important than professional qualifications. The solution seems to be in how the candidate is marketed. One avenue for further study would be to explore how people described themselves or marketed themselves on their campaign literature. For example, one respondent mentioned being "in between

jobs" at the time of the election, but presumably did not use the phrase in the campaign literature.